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In recent years, there have been numerous studies about the definitions and impacts of 
Islamophobia. The premise of this article is that by combining a number of different 
disciplines, including history and literature, we may elucidate further key contexts and 
realities about Islamophobia. As such, this article is a reflection on Islamophobia as a 
multifaceted and developing phenomena that in turn requires multidisciplinary reflection. 
Indeed, we approach the issue from different perspectives: one author is a literary critic 
and historian (who has written about early modern Europe and curated a high-profile 
exhibition on Muslims in World War One), one is a criminologist (a leading expert on 
Islamophobia and a key advisor to the UK government on how it might be defined). 
 
Current political and social climates have brought Islamophobia to the fore, including 
important questions about how and to what extent it can be defined. In the current 
context surrounding Donald Trump’s election, Brexit, and the political ascendancy of 
white nationalist parties in Europe and globally, the debate about how to define 
Islamophobia has caused controversy. In 1997, the publication of the Runnymede Trust 
report entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All was the first to define the problem 
of Islamophobia in the UK, as “the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam 
– and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims” (Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 1). 
Twenty years later, they published a new report, in which the definition (2017, p. 1) built 
upon the United Nations definition of racism: 
Any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims 
(or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life.  
 
Imran Awan and Irene Zempi (2015) define Islamophobic hate crime as any criminal 
offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated wholly or 
partly by hostility or prejudice based upon a person’s religion or perceived religion; that 
is, their Muslim religion. The All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims (2018), 
which one of the authors (Awan) has advised, also presented its definition of 
Islamophobia. Their definition, which has been backed by many academics, 
policymakers, and community groups, states that Islamophobia is “rooted in racism and 
is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness”. 
This leads to the more detailed definition by Awan and Zempi (2017, p. 2): 
A fear, prejudice and hatred of Muslims or non-Muslim individuals that leads to 
provocation, hostility and intolerance by means of threatening, harassment, 
abuse, incitement and intimidation of Muslims and non-Muslims, both in the 
online and offline world. Motivated by institutional, ideological, political and 
religious hostility that transcends into structural and cultural racism which targets 
the symbols and markers of a being a Muslim. 
 
The significance of the definition by Awan and Zempi (2017) is twofold. First, it 
emphasises the link between institutional levels of Islamophobia and manifestations of 
such attitudes, triggered by the visibility of the victim’s (perceived) Muslim identity. 
Second, this approach interprets Islamophobia as a form of racism, whereby Islamic 
religion and culture are seen as a “threat” to perceived Western values. Accordingly, 
this conceptual framework indicates that victimisation can be ideological and 
institutional (pertaining to ideas and concepts that victimise), or it can have material 
consequences for those who are victimised (through verbal and physical abuse). The 
notion of cultural racism is largely rooted in frames of inclusion and exclusion, specifying 
who may legitimately belong to a particular national or other community while, at the 
same time, determining what that community’s norms are and thereby justifying 
exclusion. 
 
Within the discussion around hate crimes, there has been a shift from race to religion: 
while the “old” racism was often based on an explicit belief of biological superiority, the 
“new” racism is based on notions of religious and cultural superiority (Awan and Zempi 
2017). Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, it could be argued that being a 
visibly practising Muslim in the US and UK did not raise the same risk of abuse or 
violence as today. In 1980s UK, “Paki-bashing” (attacks on British-Pakistanis) was 
based on race more than religion. Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2011) point out that 
“Paki-bashing” has been replaced by “Muslim-bashing” as the new dangerous street 
phenomenon. Today, it has become clearer how conceptualising racism exclusively as 
a form of “biological determinism” ignores the ways in which cultural racism draws upon 
other markers of “difference” to identify minority groups and individuals that do not 
conform with “mainstream” society (Awan and Zempi 2017). It can also be understood 
that Islamophobia as a form of racism is the new “surveillance” premised on the notion 
that cultural difference slides into the demonisation and stigmatisation of the “Other” 
cultures, apparently in the interests of “protecting” the hegemonic society and its people, 
a separate entity in their own right (Awan and Zempi, 2017). 
 
While it would be difficult and perhaps unnecessary for an official definition of 
Islamophobia to include comment on negligence or ignorance, there are many pointers 
both historically and contemporarily that indicate how negligence and ignorance can be 
key triggers of Islamophobia.  As a result, Islamophobia is often a reaction triggered by 
specific events and premised on notions of prejudice, ignorance, and seeking 
vengeance. Research indicates that a person’s visible Muslim identity often acts as a 
trigger for emotional and psychological backlash against the wider Muslim community.  
As Matthew Williams and Pete Burnap (2015) point out, hate crimes are communicative 
acts often provoked by antecedent events that incite a desire for retribution in the 
targeted group, towards the group that share similar characteristics to the perpetrators. 
From this perspective, hate crimes increase following “trigger” events, such as terrorist 
attacks, as they operate to galvanise tensions and sentiments against the suspected 
perpetrators and groups associated with them (Awan and Zempi 2015). Spikes in anti-
Muslim hate crimes and incidents following “trigger” events are not confided to offline 
settings; rather, the offline pattern is replicated online (Awan, 2014).Many of these 
involve generalisations about groups and communities. In turn, they may also based on 
imagined communities and inaccurate understandings of one’s own or one’s seemingly 
opposing group. 
 
There is much relevant historical precedence. As Islam expanded in Europe, medieval 
writers began to create inaccurate reports about the faith. As Matthew Dimmock rightly 
notes, depictions of the Abrahamic faiths in the medieval and renaissance periods do 
not offer a “single coherent narrative” (2008, p. 66). What is clear, though, is that the 
European writers of these periods caricatured Muslims and Muhammad in particular in 
largely derogatory ways. While writers like John Tolan (2002) have recorded such 
European writings in commendable detail, it remains to be added that these medieval 
responses were, by definition “Islamophobic”, stemming from a real fear of Islam, 
whether its geographical expansion or its perceived opulence. Indeed, one such 
caricature was the Turk, “warlike and bombastic” (Dimmock 2008, p. 67). 
 
View of Islam in that period offer particularly clear examples of negligent generalisations 
that actually reached a position of commonly assumed “truths”. Many of these related to 
the figure of Muhammad, who was a household name - to the extent that a 
Shakespearean character can refer to him in passing - but almost always depicted as a 
heretic and more often than not as morally wicked, wretched, drunk, and eplieptic. 
Moreover, Muhammad was regularly presented as a man who used his message to 
garner wealth and power. For instance, in art, he was depicted “as a hooofed beast 
(perhaps a stag) with a bearded human head” (Dimmock 2008, p. 71). And as Dimmock 
(2013) documents, reports about Muhammad’s death were particularly polemical: it was 
commonly reported that upon his death he was eaten by dogs, then details were added 
about the cause of death being drunkenness, before the dogs were changed to pigs. 
Influential accounts included Ranolf Higden’s famous fourteenth-century human history 
which noted: 
He hated wine drunkenness … But in a night he was drunk, and fell down in the 
street, and there swine ate him, that he held unclean beasts, therefore they that 
holdeth his law spareth wine and swine’s flesh. (1865, p. 39; spelling 
modernised). 
Similarly, in his popular work, The Fall of Princes, John Lydgate claimed more poetically 
that: “Like a glutton dyed on dronkenes / By exces of drynkynge moch wyne / Fyll in a 
podell deuoured amonge swyne” (1494, sig. E. 6v). By highlighting Muhammad’s 
objection to “wine” and “swine” so explicitly in the very account of the death, this 
belittling end, dying drunk amidst pigs, is not only disparaging, but shows the direct and 
continued obsession with Islamic prohibitions of alcohol and pork: a trait of 
Islamophobic rhetoric that continues through this very day (Awan and Issa 2018). 
 
But ignorance, as opposed to exaggeration, extends further in the travel writing and 
drama of these periods. It was commonly assumed truth, stemming from available travel 
writings, that Muhammad’s coffin, which of course is in Medina, hung in the air next to 
the Ka’aba, either magnetically or via rope, suggesting his relation to black magic or the 
trickery of the faith. The medieval pageant Herod the Great: The Slaughter of the 
Innocents - written by the Wakefield Master and telling the story of Herod’s massacre of 
newborn boys in an attempt to kill baby Jesus - begins with a reference to Muhammad, 
or “Mahowne”, in its very first line, and it becomes clear that Herod worships “Mahowne 
in heven” (Bevington, ed. ll. 1, 127). Of course, Muhammad was not born until 571 AD: 
such a conflation of time periods is uncanny and places Islam as a direct enemy to the 
Christian faith and Christ. It also suggests, like other dramas of the period, a conflation 
of Islam and Judaism, whereby the anti-Semitism of the period is easily and 
conveniently coupled with a similar, if less striking, Islamophobic narrative. What is 
more, though the political climate may have been different from today in terms of power 
dynamic, similar fears of the other exist in both contexts.  
 
If ignorance is a trigger of hate crime, the Stories of Sacrifice exhibition, which launched 
in 2016, researched and curated by one of the authors (Issa), presented the power of 
narratives that respond to gaps in general knowledge. Indeed, one of the driving forces 
for the exhibition was the relative obliviousness about the Muslim contribution to World 
War One. In 2014, an ICM survey released by the British Future thinktank revealed that 
only 2 percent of the British public were aware of the Muslim contribution to this war. In 
fact, 78 percent of people in the UK were totally unaware of the fact that people of other 
faith groups and ethnicities were even involved. While the former fact was quoted in the 
exhibition guide, there was no mention of “Islamophobia” in any exhibition content, or 
that the project was in any way reactionary. In a climate of increased Islamophobia, 
presenting the story of Muslims in the World Wars has often been used to prove 
integration, yet it was noted that this exhibition did not answer to these concerns 
directly. A write-up by Chris Hill (2018) for the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research 
Council “Voices of War and Peace” project noted:  
For Dr Issa, however, this went against the ethos of the exhibition: he wanted to 
allow the narratives of individuals to speak for themselves. How these narratives 
were then co-opted by community groups, stakeholders and the wider public was 
not his concern. ‘The moment the exhibition launched’, he claimed, ‘it ceased to 
be my work’. The politics of public ownership took over. Dr Issa’s interpretation of 
the function of the exhibition – and his role in curating it – is quite a refreshing 
one given the politicised climate around Muslims in the UK.  
What is more, as Meghan Tinsley notes in a recent doctoral thesis, “Issa was wary of 
presenting Muslim colonial subjects unequivocally as either loyal heroes or victims of 
colonial oppression. Rather, he sought to represent the diversity and individuality of 
their experiences” (2018, p. 139). 
 
The result appears to be an exhibition that responded to issues of Islamophobia in and 
of itself. First, the findings made headlines, as noted by Tinsley: “Stories of Sacrifice has 
received significant attention in the national media for Issa’s archival work. His research 
revealed that twice as many Muslims had fought in the war as had been widely 
believed” (Tinsley 2018, p. 81). By combining library-based and archival research, it 
became clear that the previously reported number of Muslims recruited by the Allies 
(most often limited to Indians and specified at 400,000) were very significantly 
understated. A figure of at least 885,000 is verifiable. The number is likely to be higher 
but would have required further verification. Moreover, a number of previously 
unreported letters by Muslim soldiers were included in the exhibition or released 
separately, including from individuals describing such experiences as visiting 
department stores or using the London Underground. 
 
Further to our contention that negligence and ignorance are triggers to Islamophobia, 
and that fear of the other remains an important aspect leading to societal divides, we 
should like to add three further points highlighted by this exhibition. 
 
First, that humanisation can be an effective response to hate. Given access to various 
public and secret archives for this exhibition, interdisciplinary research methods and 
aims were applied. In particular, the research utilised literary scholarship techniques, 
most importantly detailed textual and character analysis to examine and present, as 
works in their own right, literature derived from thousands of soldiers’ letters, officers’ 
regimental diaries, and other such materials. Aside from providing vital statistics about 
the numbers, this led to stories of sacrifice about individual named figures from the war, 
in turn, and importantly, humanising them (in large part through their normality). 
 
Second, trigger events that most often lead to increased hate crime can also result in 
positive reactions. The 2017 Manchester Arena bombing led to Greater Manchester 
Police requesting a mobile version of the exhibition to be housed in their headquarters 
for their counter-terrorism staff to see. 
 
Third, the responses showed that, depsite all of the findings and coverage, an 
Islamophobic narrative can be manipulated into many contexts. On the day of the 
launch, an English Defence League (EDL) social media page shared the news, quickly 
adding that it was proof of an inability to integrate since the exhibition is by nature 
differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims. The narrative of discontent is well 
established both by radical right groups such as the EDL and Britain First, as well as 
more political savvy groups such as UKIP and the rise of populist figures across 
Europe, like Marine Le Pen. 
 
This last point brings us to the very present day. Radical right groups such as Britain 
First promote and incite racial and religious hostility. The group’s credentials are 
seriously undermined by the recent convictions of its two leaders, Jayda Francis and 
Paul Golding, and it continues to be an active voice of Islamophobia in Britain today. We 
mention them here because they are a clear example of the ever-changing reality of 
Islamophobia, most notably, the digital factor and its ability to propel the ignorant or 
negligent messaging of the phenomenon. Despite the concerns raised about the group, 
the US President Donald Trump retweeted three videos from the Britain First social 
media account related to alleged Islamist violence. The three videos purported to show 
a Muslim man destroying a Virgin Mary statute, another showed a someone attacking a 
boy on crutches, and a third video showed men pushing a boy from a building. The 
videos clearly were horrific and quickly turned into anti-Muslim hostility. The problem, 
however, was that all of the videos, posted originally by Fransen, were in fact fake. 
Indeed, Britain and its social media accounts are littered with short videos depicting 
violence apparently perpetrated by Muslims. In a statement issued from Downing 
Street, the British Prime Minister at the time, Theresa May, stated that: “Britain First 
seeks to divide communities by their use of hateful narratives that peddle lies and stoke 
tensions. They cause anxiety to law-abiding people … It is wrong for the president to 
have done this” (Reuters 2017). Social media companies such as Twitter and Facebook 
have taken action against the leaders of far-right groups such as Tommy Robinson 
(former leader of the EDL) who has had his Twitter account removed. Research shows 
that social media comments of an Islamophobic nature can lead to a spike in hate 
incidents. The rise of Islamophobic incidents following political statements in Europe 
and the US also shows a revealing pattern. For example, Between January and 
September 2017, the Council for American Muslim Relations recorded 1,656 so-called 
“bias incidents” and 195 hate crimes. That represented a 9% increase in bias incidents 
and a 20% rise in hate crimes compared to 2016. 
 
In looking at the future landscape, then, it is crucial that Islamophobia, as well as its 
contexts and manifestations, are observed through a globalized, historic, and 
contemporary lens. Such an approach shows the existence of both trends and changes. 
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